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THE PRETEXT OF TEXTUALISM: DISREGARDING STARE
DECISIS IN 14 PENNPLAZA V. PYETT
by
MargaretL. Moses*
In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Supreme Court ignored the
principles of stare decisis and justified its disregard of precedent
established thirty-five years earlier in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. on the basis of changed judicial methods of interpretation. This
article will examine how the Supreme Court, in Pyett, as well as in other
decisions, has used the judicial method of interpretation known as
textualism, including a version I call "no-text textualism," to reinvent
statutes, abandon precedent, and create its own norms in the field of
arbitration.The Pyett decision demonstrates how the Supreme Court has
freely disregarded a statute's text, its legislative history, and even the
Court's own judicial precedent when fashioning a law of arbitrationto
suit its policy preferences. In the field of arbitration, the Court's use of
textualism has frequently served as a pretext for creating national law
and policy that differ substantiallyfrom statutory text and purpose as
evidenced by legislative history. Pyett serves as a strong invitation to
Congress to adopt new legislation that will overturn inconsistent
"legislation"created by the Court.
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INTRODUCTION

"Principles of stare decisis. . . demand respect for precedent whether
judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same. Were that not so,
those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and
upon which the rule of law depends."' A year after making this statement,
the Supreme Court ignored the principles of stare decisis in 14 Penn
Plaza LLC v. Pyeti and justified its disregard of precedent established in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 3 because it had changed judicial methods
of interpretation . This is a rather unusual basis for abandoning
precedent. Normally, when there has been no intervening amendment
by Congress, the Court is bound by its prior interpretation of a statute
under the principles of stare decisis.
This Article will examine how the Supreme Court in Pyett, as well as
in other decisions, has used the judicial method of interpretation known
as textualism 6 including a version I call "no-text textualism," to reinvent
statutes, abandon precedent, and create its own norms in the field of
arbitration. Pyett serves as a strong invitation to Congress to adopt new
legislation that will overturn inconsistent "legislation" created by the
Court. Pyett demonstrates how the Supreme Court has freely disregarded
a statute's text, its legislative history, and even the Court's own judicial
precedent when fashioning a law of arbitration to suit its own policy
preferences. In the field of arbitration, the Court's use of textualism has
frequently served as a pretext for creating national law and policy that
differ substantially from both statutory text and congressional intent
behind enactment.
In Pyett, the majority held that in a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), union and management could require an individual to arbitrate
CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 1285S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (emphasis added).
Ct. 1456 (2009).
415 U.S. 36 (1974).

21295S.

The Court asserted that a new interpretation was warranted because prior
Supreme Court decisions rested on either an 'analytical mistake" or a "misconceived
view of arbitration." Fyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1464 n.5, 1469.
'Once the Court has construed a statute, it will not depart from stare decisis
"without some compelling justification." Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S.
197, 202 (1991). The majority in Pyett raised no compelling justification for its
departure from the holding of Gardner-Denver. The statement that prior Supreme
Court arbitration decisions rested upon a "misconceived view" suggests that the
current Court has a different ideology or a different methodology of construction
from prior Courts. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1469. Such a non-compelling justification for
disregarding precedent is exactly what stare decisis was meant to prevent.
6 See generally Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURtTS AND THE L-Aw 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Jonathan
T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2006).
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his statutory discrimination claims and forego the right to bring a civil
rights claim in court. 7 This meant that without obtaining the individual's
consent, union and management could waive the employee's statutory
right to resolve his claim of discrimination in court. CBAs are contracts
between the union and management and, until Pyett, had never been
interpreted to require an individual employee, who is not a party to the
contract, to give up the statutory right provided 'in civil rights statutes to
bring a claim of individual discrimination in court. In reaching its
decision, the Court went against the well-established thirty-five year old
precedent of Gardner-Denver,which held that a CBA between union and
management could not waive an individual employee's right to bring a
statutory civil rights claim in court. 8 Under Gardner-Denver, even if the
union took the employee's claim to arbitration and lost, the employee
could still subsequently assert his discrimination claim in federal court.9
In reaching a different conclusion in Pyett, the Court reversed the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals which had held, in reliance on GardnerDenver, that "a collective bargaining agreement could not waive covered
workers' rights to a j udicial forum for causes- of action created- byCongress." The Supreme Court held the opposite, that individual union
members can be required to forego a judicial forum and arbitrate
individual statutory civil rights claims under a CBA, despite the lack of
any individual consent."
In its decision, the Court claimed to rely on the texts of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) ,' the National Labor
13
Relations Act (NLRA) , and the Civil Rights Act

1

of 19911

as reasons for

disregarding its precedent in Gardner-Denver. It also relied on the change
in judicial methods of interpretation since its Gardner-Denver decision in
1974. One important methodological difference is the growth of support
for the doctrine of textualism. Statutory interpretation, over the last
twenty-five years or so, has been sometimes viewed as a battle between
textualism, a focus almost exclusively on the text of the statute, and
purposivism or intentioiialisni, a focus on either the purpose of the
statute or the intent of the legislature, obtained from an examination of

See 129 S. Ct. at 1474.

Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1974).
See id. at 59-60 ("[A] employee [can]I pursue fully both his remedy under the
grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of
action under Title VII.").
Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 91 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007).
See Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1456, 1475-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'~29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
"29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
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the legislative history of the statute.' 5 Plirposivism and intentionalism
involve consideration by courts of the historical context of the statute,
looking to the legislative processes as well as the statute as a whole to
determine what Congress intended to accomplish, and then interpreting
the text consistent with that intent or with the purpose of the statute. 1
The textualists, on the other hand, led by justice Antonin Scalia,
believe that in interpreting a statute, judges should look primarily, if not
exclusively, at the language of the statute to determine its meaning.'"
Although textualists will acknowledge that "context" may be important,
to them "context" means dictionary definitions, canons of construction,
grammatical use, and how a particular term may be used in other parts of
the same statute or in related statutes. 18 "Context," to textualists, does not
include the historical or legislative context. For the most part, textualists
consider legislative history to be irrelevant, because they believe
legislative history cannot show the actual purpose or intent of Congress.' 9
According to textualists, many members of Congress will have little actual
knowledge about the legislation or will have different purposes in voting
for it; therefore, there is no ascertainable group intent.2 From a
textualist perspective, to the extent legislative intent can be known, it will
be found in the text of the statute. Textualists also put forth an interest
group critique asserting that the manipulation by partisan groups makes

See, eg., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legi.slative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 427-28 (2005); Charles
Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L.
Rtv. 205, 206-14 (2000); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L.
REv. 1883, 1898-1905 (2008).
"6 Intentionalists discern and apply the legislature's intent, usually based on both
the text and the legislative history. Purposivists identify the purpose of the statute and
attempt to interpret the statute consistently with that purpose. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REv. 321, 325-26, 332-33 (1990); Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes
in Light of PrevailingLegal Precedent, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 815, 818-19 (2002).
"See Scalia, supra note 6, at 29-37.
place heavy emphasis on
ISee Molot, supra note 6, at 44 ("[T]extualists ...
dictionary definitions, the use of identical language in other statutory provisions, and
,textual' or 'linguistic' canons of construction that have nothing to do with statutory
purposes or societal effects.").
"See Tiefer, supra note 15, at 215-16.
20 See id. See also, Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 130 S. Ct. 1324, 134142 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[The
House Report] tell [s] us nothing about what the statute means, since (1) we do not
know that the members of the Committee read the Report, (2) it is almost certain
that they did not vote on the Report (that is not the practice), and (3) even if they
did read and vote on it, they were not, after all, those who made this law.").
15
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legislative reports and drafting history unreliable .2 ' To textualists,
because legislative history is unreliable, a focus on it simply permits a
22
judge to put forth his or her own preferred interpretation of the statute.
Although textualism has had significant influence on the Supreme
Court's decisions, in recent times there has been a resurgence of support
for the importance of legislative history in interpreting statutes.
Increasingly, scholars have put forth empirical, constitutional, and
philosophical support, as well as theory from developmental psychology
and linguistics, to confirm legislative history as a critical element in the
process of interpreting legislation . They point out that denying the
relevance of the historical context of a statute simply means the statute is
understood in some other context, rather than the constitutionallypreferred context, which involves the process of congressional approval
and presentment to the President.2 One commentator maintains that
"legislative history is the best evidence of what occurred during the
bicameral and presentment processlies], [and therefore] provides a

2!

See Molot, supra note 6, at 28 ("[B] orrowing heavily from public choice theory,

textualists emphasized that the legislative process is messy and full of compromises,

some principled and some unprincipled.").
22 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative Hitcny in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting a conversation with
judge Leventhal for the proposition that citing legislative history is like "looking over
a crowd and picking out your friends").
23 See, eg., Cheryl Boudreau et al.,
Wh'7at Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from
Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. Rrv. 957, 964 (2007)
("[S]tatutes are a form of human communication.... When an interpreter
substitutes his or her own meaning for the meaning intended by Congress, the
interpreter usurps the authority granted to the legislature by the Constitution.");
James J. Brudney, Intentionalism's Revival, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1001, 1002 (2007)
('Advocates for an intentionalist approach have applied lessons from political
science, democratic constitutionalism, analytic philosophy, and developmental
psychology to help justify the existence and importance of a collective legislative
purpose that can illuminate statutory meaning under the right conditions." (citations
omnitted)); Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional Defense of Legislative History, 13 Wm. &
MARY BILL Rrs. J. 1267, 1286 (2005) ("Because legislative history is the best evidence
of what occurred during the bicameralism and presentment process, that material
provides a constitutionally-prefer-red context for interpreting statutory text."); Molot,
supra note 6, at 2 ("Textualism has outlived its utility as an intellectual movement.");
Solan, supra note 15, at 484 ("[1] t is both natural and sensible to talk about the intent
of a group, especially a group that makes decisions together through deliberation.");
Tiefer, supra note 15, at 206-11, 250-71 (discussing the new concept of using
legislative history developed by justices Breyer and Stevens beginning in 1995, and
the support for such use found in analytical philosophy and political theory).
24 See McGreal, supra note 23. at 1287 ("When justice Scalia refers to plain
text.
what he really means is text understood in some context other than the statute's
legislative history. Thus, the real choice is not between text and legislative history, but
rather between text understood within its legislative history and text understood
within some other context.").
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2
constitutionally-preferred context for interpreting the statutory text. 5
Communication scholars state that because legislators compress meaning
when writing statutes, decoding or expanding the meaning when
applying or interpreting the statutes requires an understanding of how
the legislation was manufactured throughout the legislative process.
Moreover, as to ascertaining congressional intent, studies from the fields
of psychology, political science, philosophy, and communication all
support the coherence and validity of group intent, and the importance
of the broader historical context of a statute to convey that intent. 27

Furthermore, one of the textualists' main complaints-that judges
use legislative history to manipulate meaning to accord with their own
policy preferences-does not find empirical support. For example, a
study of the use of legislative history by liberal justices in workplace cases
concluded that in this area, these justices relied on legislative history in a
non-ideological fashion. In other words, in interpreting statutes, the
liberal justices followed the logic of the legislative history, whether or not
it led in the direction of their perceived policy preferences .2
Manipulation of legislative history to obtain a particular result is less
likely than manipulation of a textual interpretation by judges who reach
an ideological result by ignoring legislative history.' As a number of
scholars have pointed out, when a judge ignores the historical context
that demonstrates the intent of the enacting Congress and substitutes his
own meaning, he is usurping the authority granted to the legislature by
the Constitution .
This is not to say that textualism has not made contributions to the
interpretation of statutes. A focus on the language of a statute is certainly

" Id. at 1286.
See Bloudreau et al., supra note 23, at 958-64. "[T]he purpose of statutory
interpretation is to produce a constitutionally legitimate decoding of statutory
commands in cases where the meaning. ...
is contested." Id. at 959.
21 See generally, Molot, supra note 6; Solan, supra note 15; Tiefer, supra note 15.
28 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal justices' Reliance on Legislative
21

History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29

BERKELEYJ.

Emp. & LAB. L. 117, 173

(2008).
2See id. at 139. The study showed that liberal justices used legislative history to
help support pro-employer outcomes more often that pro-employee outcomes.
30 See McGreal, supra note 23, at 1289-90 ("[W]e must hypothesize a context
within which to understand the words. ... [Justice Scalia] neither acknowledges the
need to choose a context, nor provides a standard or method for making that choice.
Without standards, the decision is wholly unconstrained, leaving maximum
discretion.... With justice Scalia's hypothetical contexts ... both the chosen words
and their context spring from the judge's imagination. No external source
circumscribes that choice, leaving the judge free to manipulate the hypothetical
context to suit her preferred interpretation.").
3See, e.g, Boudreau et al., supra note 23, at 964; McGreal, supra note 23, at 128788.
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important and may serve to discourage courts from relying on the

purpose of the statute to expand the statutory

3

text.

2

However, textualists

tend to ignore the reality that judicial leeway is always present in the
interpretation of statutes. First of all, there is leeway in determining if the
statute is clear or ambiguous. To the extent textualists believe that
textualism can eliminate ambiguity and the need to understand the
purpose of the statute, they are expanding their own judicial discretion.
Professor Jonathan Molot has noted:
[A] s textualist scholars and judges begin to believe that textualist
tools can be employed not just to resolve statutory ambiguity, but
also to eliminate it, the opportunities for judicial creativity and
abuse increase dramatically. Indeed, by placing so much emphasis
on the distinction between clarity and ambiguity, and by rushing to
find clarity and thereby excluding consideration of statutory
purposes, aggressive textualism may undemine. .. [the] ability to
cabin judicial discretion.
Second, it is one thing to focus on the language of the statute, and
something else entirely to focus on the absence of language in the
statute. In a number of major decisions shaping the Court's various
interpretations of statutes with respect to arbitration, the Court has relied
on what I call "no-text textualism" to derive the specific meaning of a
statute by interpreting what is actually not in the statute at all. This moves
the textualists in the direction of the purposivists they criticize for
expanding the statute beyond its actual text. When there is no text on
which the Court bases its interpretation, and when it has divorced the
actual text from any congressional intent or purpose, then the Court can
easily turn a statute on its head.
Third, in Pyett, the Court relied on policies it created from whole
cloth, unrelated to the text of any statute, and then rejected policies
relied on in its prior decisions as not being based on the text of the
statute. The majority's rejection of prior Supreme Court policies for not
being text-based, as well as its reliance on no-text textualism, were key to
its dismissal of statutory precedent that was thirty-five years old, had never
been overruled, and had been 3 reaffirmed over the years by both
Congress34and the Supreme Court. 1
32 See Tiefer, supra note 15, at 214 (noting that decisions of the Warren Court in
the 1960s and early 1970s were criticized as expanding statutes by liberal, purposive
readings that found implied private causes of action in regulatory statutes). For
example, in JL Case Co. v. Borak, the Court created an implied right of action for
securities fraud, despite no specific reference to a private right of action in the text of

the statute. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
33 Molot, supra note 6, at 49-50.
(stating that "any agreement to
3See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 102A40, at 97 (1991)
submit disputed issues to arbitration . .. in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement ... does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the
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11. THE PRETEXT OF TEXTUALISM
Although focusing on the text is something one should do when
interpreting a statute, the kind of disconnected textualism practiced by
the Supreme Court in many of its arbitration decisions in the last twentyfive years has been simply a pretext to mask its instrumental motivation.
What the Court has actually been doing is rewriting statutes with two
related goals in mind. One is to remove cases from court dockets,
particularly those pesky discrimination and consumer protection cases,
and the second is to undermine enforcement of individual rights and
protections, producing advantages for big business and commercial
interests." The actual text of a statute has frequently had very little to do
with the decision reached. In too many instances, textualism has become
a pretext for reaching a preferred result.
In Pyett, the Court directly interpreted three statutes, the NLRA, the
ADEA, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and indirectly two others, Title
VII and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The Court's goal with respect
to the interpretation of each statute was to overcome the principle of
stare decisis, based on its earlier Gardner-Denver decision, in order to
further expand the scope of its judicially-created arbitration policy. In
Gardner-Denver, the Court had unanimously held that an employee's
statutory right to bring a discrimination claim in court could not be
waived by a union as part of the collective bargaining process. GardnerDenver was based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but courts
have long held that the ADEA is similar in purpose and application to
Title VII, and that the analysis of one statute is pertinent to the other.

enforcement provisions of Title VII," and noting that this view is "consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in ... Gardner-Denver. . .")
3See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984);
Barrentine
v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981).
36 See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and jurisdiction, 1996 Sup.
CT. Riw. 331, 333 (1996) ("Those who have been prejudiced by the Court's
handiwork include many American consumers, patients, workers, investors,
shopkeepers, shippers, and passengers. Those whose interests have been served
include all those engaged in interstate or international commerce deploying their
economic power to evade enforcement of their contractual duties or the lash of those
state or federal commercial laws that are privately enforced.").
" See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("[The]
interpretation of Title VII .. . applies with equal force in the context of age
discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA 'were derived in haec verba
from Title VII.'" (quoting Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)) (citations
omitted)). See also. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358
(1995) ("The ADEA and Title VII share common substantive features and also a
common purpose."). But cf., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348-49
(2009) (where the Court failed to interpret the ADEA in line with Title VII as to
burden of proof).
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Thus, there was no claim by the parties or the Court in Pyett that any
distinction should be made between the interpretations of the two
statutes.
An important earlier decision leading up to Pyett-Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp3-had also involved the ADEA. In that
decision, an employee, required to register as a securities representative,
had completed a registration application which included an agreement
to arbitrate." When he was terminated he brought suit, which his
employer countered with a motion to compel arbitration 4 0 The Court
held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable .' It distinguished
Gardner-Denver because in that case the employee had not agreed to
arbitrate, and the arbitrators were not authorized to resolve statutory
claims .4 2 It also distinguished Gardner-Denver because the arbitration
occurred in a collective bargaining context, noting "the tension between
collective representation and individual statutory rights, [was] a concern
not applicable to [Mr. Gilmer] .
Part of the "tension" referred to in Gilmer was the potential conflict
between the union and the employee. Although the union has sole
authority to make the decision under the CBA whether or not to
arbitrate on an employee's behalf, an employee's statutory discrimination
claim could potentially be brought against the union. Deciding whether
to represent an individual with a claim of discrimination against the
union certainly raises a conflict for a union.
A few years after Gilmer, the Court in Wright v. Universal Maritime
Service Corp. held that in a CBA, the union could not waive covered
employees' rights to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment

discrimination absent a "clear and unmistakable waiver" of those

rights.

45

It found there was no such waiver in the case before it, but it also stated
that it was not deciding whether, if there were such a waiver, it would be
enforceable.4 The decision was perceived, however, by a number of
unions, including Local 32BJ of the Service Employees International

3500
'"
40

Id. at 23-24.

41See
42

U.S. 20 (1991).

Id. at 23.

id. at 23.

See id. at 35.

43 id.
4'
Title VII and the ADEA both prohibit discrimination by labor organizations.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (c) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (c) (2006).
45
46

525 U.S. 70, 79-81 (1998).

Id. at 81-82.
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Union-the union involved in the Pyett case-as an invitation to include
such a specific waiver in its CBA 4.
Accordingly, when it granted certiorari in Pyett, the Court believed
that the CBA before it contained a clear and unmistakable waiver of the

employees' right to bring a statutory claim of discrimination in

court.4

Thus, despite the unanimous holding of Gardner-Denver that a union
cannot waive an individual's right to a federal forum, reaffirmed in a
number of subsequent Supreme Court decisions 4 9 and despite the
principle of stare decisis, the Pyett Court, in a five to four decision,
reached an opposite conclusion. It held that a CBA that clearly required
arbitration as the exclusive remedy of an employee's statutory
discrimination claim was enforceable.'5 In order to do so, the Court had
to discredit the various lines of reasoning of the Gardner-DenverCourt,
and claim that the Gardner-Denver holding was extremely narrow. In the
process, it also interpreted the NLRA, the ADEA, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, based on a combination of its version of textualism, including
"no-text textualism," and of its own non-text based judicially-created
policies.
A.

The NLRA and the ADEA

There is nothing in the text of NLRA that deals with statutory claims
of employment discrimination based on race, sex, age, etc. The statute,
adopted in 1935, makes clear that its purpose was to permit employees to
organize unions and bargain collectively in order to promote labor

" See Brief of the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 13, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456
(2009) (No. 07-581) [hereinafter Brief of the Service Employees International Union]
("[Tihe standard no-discrimination clause in the Local 32BJ/Realty Advisory Board
collective bargaining agreements was amended in 1999 to take account of this Court's
decision in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.").
"8 The waiver was not as "clear and unmistakable" as it first appeared. See infra
notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
'See Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1981)
("[Iln Alexander v. Gardner-Denver... [tihe Court found that in enacting Title VII,
Congress had granted individual employees a nonwaivable, public law right to equal
employment opportunities that was separate and distinct from the rights created
through the 'majoritarian processes' of collective bargaining. Moreover, because
Congress had granted aggrieved employees access to the courts, and because
contractual grievance and arbitration procedures provided an inadequate forum for
enforcement of Title VII rights, the Court concluded that Title VII claims should be
resolved by the courts de novo." (citations omnitted)). See also, McDonald v. City of W.
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984) ("[O]ur decisions in Barrentine and Gardner-Denver
compel the conclusion that [arbitration] cannot provide an adequate substitute for a
judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitutional rights that
§ 1983 is designed to safeguard.").
'0 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009).
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peace. 5' Nothing in the text of the NLRA addresses or permits the
arbitration of individual statutory discrimination claims, because this was
simply never contemplated in 1935, and is not within the scope of the
statute. Nonetheless, the Pyett Court ignored the lack of text with respect
to this point and fell back upon the policy of "freedom of contract" to
assert that as long as a CBA provision governing individual ADEA claims
is negotiated between the employer and the union, it is properly within
the "broad sweep" of the NLRA, unless prohibited by the ADEA. 52 T isi
the first step of the Court's innovative "no-text textualism." If there is no
text prohibiting arbitration of statutory claims, then it must be permitted,
unless the prohibition is found in the ADEA.
The Court then turned to an interpretation of the text of the ADEA.
There is, of course, nothing in the text of the ADEA that states that an
individual's ADEA claim can be required to be arbitrated under a CBA
without that individual's consent. The Court thus resorted further to its
interpretative method of "no-text textualism," interpreting the absence of
pertinent text as establishing that what the Court wished to do was
permitted. Quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Ch?ysler-Plymouth, Inc.,~

where it first developed this no-text

ploy754

and Gilmer, in which it also

took up the banner, the Court stated that "'if Congress intended the
substantive protection afforded by the ADEA to include protection
against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be
deducible from text or legislative history."' 5 5 In other words, since
nothing in the statutory text said anything about protecting an individual
against the waiver of the right to go to court, then Congress intended to
permit waiver. Although nothing in the text of either the NLRA or the
ADFA supported the Court's position, according to its "no-text
textualism," it was carrying out the will of Congress when it adopted its
own policy of choice.
"29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) ("Experience has proved that protection by law of the
right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from
injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by
removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of
differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality
of bargaining power between employers and employees.").
52

Pyeit, 129 S. Ct. at 1459. The freedom of contract principle is not really

applicable in this situation, however, because freedom of contract applies only to the
parties to the contract, not to non-contracting parties, like the individual employees.
"473 U.S. 614 (1985) (enforcing an arbitration agreement requiring arbitration
in Japan of U.S. antitrust claims raised by Puerto Rican car dealership).
'See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 99, 138-3
(2006).
55 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628, and
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991)).
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Because the textualists on the Court think that legislative history is
irrelevant, they did not consider the fact that when the 6ADEA was
adopted in 1967, statutory claims were simply not arbitrated , 5 So it would
not have occurred to Congress to prohibit something that was not
permitted anyway. Arbitration of statutory claims only really began in
1985 with Mitsubishi. 17 There, the Court used the same no-text textualism
tactic to find that, although the text of the FAA (from 1925) only dealt
with contract claims and not statutory claims, nonetheless, because the
text did not expressly prohibit statutory claims, Congress intended
statutory antitrust claims to be arbitrated .5 8 Essentially, the Court's view is
that if Congress said nothing about an issue, even though it was not
pertinent at the time the statute was enacted, theni the Court can
interpret the statute to support its own policy preferences based on the
absence of text.
Thus, using the statutory interpretation method of no-text
textualism, the Court concluded that because the text said nothing,
Congress must have intended ADEA claims to be determined by
arbitration under a CBA without the individual's consent. The far more
likely scenario is that Congress did not foresee that anyone would ever
think that individual discrimination claims under Title VII or the ADEA
could be forced into arbitration under a CBA without the consent of the
individual. However, because Congress did not prohibit involuntary
arbitration of statutory claims, then according to the no-text textualism of
the Court, this was permitted, because there was "no evidence that
'Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of
claims under that Act."'' 59 The Court's approach is to articulate its policy
preference despite the absence of any textual support, and then interpret
that absence in the text to mean its policy prevails.
A true textualist, looking at the NLRA, would have to conclude that
nothing in the statute supports the Court's conclusion. And an
examination of the text of the ALDEA would reveal that the elaborate
federal machinery put in place for a claimant to file a charge would make
it more likely than not that Congress did not intend for ADEA claims to
56 See Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King, The Statutory Arbitrator and the
Demise ofJudicialReview, 2009 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 2-3, 14-16 (2009) (noting that for over
three hundred years, arbitration had been viewed as a way for commercial disputes to
be resolved between merchants, and that statutory claims, except in very rare cases,
were simply not decided in arbitration). The Supreme Court's decision in 1985 in
Mitsubishi that statutory antitrust claims could be arbitrated created a major paradigm
shift.
5473 U.S. at 626-27.
5See id. at 628 ("[M f Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a
given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to ajudicial forum, that
intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.").
Py]ett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35).
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be shunted into arbitration by a union-management contract.
Specifically, because the focus in the text of the statute is on the
importance of protecting the individual rights of the older worker, the
text does not suggest in any way that the right of the individual to bring
its case in court could be removed without its consent.6
The Court brushed over completely the core aspect of arbitration:
consent. The power of the arbitrators only comes from the consent of the
parties who agree to come before them. There is no textual support in
the NLRA or the ADEA for finding that an employee can be forced to
arbitrate her individual statutory claim without her consent. The Court
ignored this, asserting that there was no difference in an employee who
consented directly, as in Gilmer, and one who agreed by union
representation .6 ' The Court's choice of words is interesting: "Nothing in
the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration
agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a
union representative. 6 3 The Court did not identify' which law (or text) it
was referring to-the ADEA or the NLRA-but it does not really matter,
because the Court was again resorting to no-text textualism. It is the lack
of text that persuaded the Court to conclude that agreeing directly is the
same as having someone else agree for you without your consent. The
result of the no-text methodology is that if the path the Court wants to
tread is not specifically prohibited in the statute's text, then, according to
the Court, this provides evidence that the path it selected should be
taken.
6' A true textualist would also consider how specific provisions of the statute
might bear on the question of waiver. The ADEA was amended in 1990 by the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 201, 104 Stat. 983 (1990), to
add a new section, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f), which permits waiver of ADEA rights only if the
waiver is "knowing and voluntary." This was to ensure that older workers did not give
up their rights in settlement with an employer unless they truly understood what they
were giving up. There are extensive procedural steps which must be followed,
including the right to consult with an attorney, the right to consideration that is in
addition to what the employee is already entitled to receive, at least twenty-one days
to consider the employer's offer, and seven days after execution during which the
employee may revoke his consent. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2006). Some courts have held
that these protections only apply to an employee's waiver of its substantive rights
under the ADEA, rather than a waiver of its right to bring its case in court. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1995); Seus v. John
Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1998). However, it seems incongruous
that legislation would make it very difficult for an employee to waive its substantive
rights under the ADF.A, and yet at the same time intend to make it very easy for a
union to waive the employee's right to go to court, particularly when the union could
decide in good faith not to bring an arbitration on behalf of the employee.
61 See Volt Into. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 479 (1989) (-Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion.").
62 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465.

63 id.
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Yet, consider what the Court is saying: There is no difference
between situations where Ms. Jones, an employee, agrees directly with her
employer to arbitrate ADEA claims, or where the same Ms. Jones, if her
employment is covered by a union, is bound by her union, without her
consent, to have her ADEA claims arbitrated instead of litigated in court.
It is like the difference between Ms. Jones agreeing with Mr. Smith to buy
his house, or Ms. Jones, without her consent, being bound by her broker
to buy Mr. Smith's house. Most people think there is a difference.
The only way one can understand the perspective of the Court is
simply to recognize that the Court has little if any regard for an
individual's statutory rights to be free from discrimination. For example,
despite the obvious efforts of Congress to protect the individual rights of
employees to equal employment opportunities, the Court is perfectly
satisfied to let those rights be subordinated to the rights of the union and
the employer, the more powerful parties in the transaction, who benefit
from controlling the arbitration process.
B.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991

The disregard for an individual's statutory rights can also be seen in
the Court's so-called textual analysis of a provision in a third statute
involved in Pyett-the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 4 The Pyett majority set
forth the "plain language" of this statute as another basis for asserting
that Congress intended to permit unions to waive an individual's right to
take her ADEA claim to court. Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act says
that "[w] here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of
Federal law amended by this title." ~'Taking what it claimed was a
textualist approach, the Court maintained that the text of the Civil Rights
Act was clear." It asserted that the word "arbitration" included both
commercial arbitration and collective bargaining arbitration.
It thus
concluded that the term supported its position that in a collective
bargaining context, the union could waive the employee's right to bring
AjDEA claims in court.6
In rendering this interpretation, the Court expressly rejected a
House Report that contradicted its view .6That Report commented with
respect to section 118 that if an employee were to submit his claims to

L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118.
66See Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465 n.6.
67 see id.
61See id.
61See id.
6Pub.

65
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arbitration in the context of a CBA, he would not be precluded from
seeking relief in federal court under Tidle VII.70 Importantly, the House
Report went on to state, "This view is consistent with the Supreme
7

Court's interpretation of Tidle VII in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.",

1

Of course, at the time the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1991, the
Supreme Court had expressly set forth, in Gardner-Denverand in other
cases, its view that the union could not, in a CBA, waive an individual's
statutory right to bring claims in court. The House Report emphasized
the intent in section 118 of the Civil Rights Act to support consensual
alternative dispute resolution without precluding an employee from
individually protecting his statutory right in court. 7
Yet, the Pyett majority asserted that the House Report
mischaracterized the holding of Gardner-Denver, which, according to the
majority, did not protect the employee from union waiver if statutory
claims were clearly covered by the CBA It should be noted that in 1991,
not a single court or scholar shared the Pyett majority's view of the
Gardner-Denverholding. Nonetheless, the Pyett Court claimed that the text
of the Civil Rights statute was clear and unambiguous: it encouraged
arbitration for dispute resolution without imposing any constraints on
collective bargaining. Accordingly, in the Court's view, waiver by the
union of the employee's right to try ADEA claims in court was textually

supported in the

Act. 75Thus,

concluded the Court, because there was a

conflict between the text and the legislative history, the text must
prevail 7.
The Court's analysis is not supported by the text of the Civil Rights
Act. Although nothing in the text of the Civil Rights Act says that
arbitration of ADEA claims within collective bargaining is excluded, it is
equally true that nothing in the text states that arbitration will preclude
an employee from going to court on his statutory claims. More
significantly, the House Report took pains, first, to point out that the
Civil Rights Act was not intended to limit an employee who arbitrated
from also taking his claim to court, and second, to note that this was its
understanding of the holding of Gardner-Denver. At best, the text of
section 118 is ambiguous, because two interpretations might arguably be
made, that of the Pyett Court and that of the House Report. In that light,

'0See id.
"See H.R. REP. No. 10240, at 97 (1991).
12
Id. ("[A] ny agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration ... in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement. ...does not preclude the affected
person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.").
"129 S. Ct. at 1465 n.6.
74 id.
71

See id.

76

See id.
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the Court's assertion that the text is clear is a good example of one of the
abuses of textualists, which is to find clarity where there is none. This is
the kind of abuse that can lead to uncabined judicial discretion, because
clarity, to the textualist, means that a particular judge can determnine
77
meaning without any regard to historical or legislative context.
Moreover, although ambiguity arguably exists, pertinent information
points in a different direction from the majority's view, based on the
historical context, that is, what everyone at the time understood the
holding of Gardner-Denverto be, and the specific statement of the House
Report. These factors suggest that the majority's assertion that the text is
clear and unambiguous is a simple pretext for reaching a result not
intended by Congress but desired by a majority of the Court."'
Ironically, a primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to expand
the scope of relevant civil rights statutes, and it was adopted pursuant to a
specific finding that the Supreme Court "has weakened the scope and
effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections. 7 9 Yet, despite this specific
language in the text of the statute, the Court's textual analysis did not
consider whether its interpretation of section 118 would strengthen the
scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights protections. To the
contrary, Pyett demonstrates how the Court has continued to create law
and policy that undercut civil rights protections, while disingenuously
asserting that it was respecting the choice made by Congress. 0 For
example, in the first part of the Pyett decision, the Court relied upon its
methodology of no-text textualism to conclude that examination of the
NLRA and the ADEA "yields a straightforward answer to the question
presented,"8 i.e., that arbitration of an individual ADEA claim under a
CBA is enforceable as an exclusive remedy, despite the lack of individual
consent. It then claimed that accordingly, [t] he judiciary must respect
[Congress's] choice.""'
The Court is so far removed from respecting the choice made by
Congress that it calls to mind an observation made by justice Aharon
Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel. justice Barak observed that the
"'4minimalist' judge 'who holds that the purpose of the statute may be
learned only from its language' has more discretion than the judge 'who

See Molot, supra note 6 and text accompanying note 33.
'8 In this context, the Court stated, "'[W]e do not resort to legislative history to
cloud a statutory text that is clear.'" Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465 n.6 (quoting Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994)).
9Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2(2).
'0 Seel129 S. Ct. at 1466.
71

81 Id.
82

id.
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will seek guidance from every reliable source.' "" In citing to justice Barak
in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 14 justice Stevens noted in his dissent
that "[a] method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately
uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is
consistent with a court's own views of how things should be, but it may
also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted."5~ Using
no-text textualism, disengaged from any historical or legislative context,
the Court arrived at its own choice, not the choice made by Congress in
the ADEA or the NLRA.
C. DiscreditingGardner-Denver
Claiming to have answered the question presented by means of its
"textual" interpretation of statutes, the Court then proceeded to address
its prior decision in Gardner-Denver. Its purpose in the second part of the
Pyett decision is to narrow and discredit Gardner-Denver, in order to
overcome its stare decisis effect. Because Gardner-Denverwas decided in
1974, the law and policy reflected therein are consistent with the first fifty
years of interpretation of the FAA. The Court's major decisions that
rewrote the FAA began when it created the "liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration" in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp. in 1983." Then, in 1984, the Court declared in
" Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens,

dissenting (quoting

AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION

J.,

62 (Yadin Kaufmann trans.,

1989))).
14
In Circuit City, the Court held, despite clear evidence to the contrary in both
the text and legislative history, that almost all workers were covered by the FAA. 532
U.S. at 119. See also Moses, supra note 54, at 148-49 ("Nothing in the FAA text
suggests that 'other workers' should be limited to transportation workers rather than,
as the text clearly states, 'any other class of workers engaged in foreign and interstate
commerce.' [9. U.S.C. § 1] By refusing to assess the legislative history, allegedly
because the text was so clear, the Court es~sentially freed itself to follow its own
preferences and policies as to the structure and application of the FAA, rather than
to interpret the legislation actually enacted.").
5Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 133.
86 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). There was no basis for the statement in Moses H. Cone
that section 2 of the FAA "is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." Id. at 24. Nothing in the legislative history suggests
that Congress favored arbitration. Rather, Congress agreed to adopt the FAA so that
arbitration contracts could be enforced like other contracts. The FAA was designed to
place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts." H.R. Rep.
No. 68-96 (1924). The policy the Supreme Court announced in Moses H. Cone was a
policy that concerned labor arbitrations, but not commercial arbitrations. There are
national policy justifications for favoring arbitration of a CBA-to promote industrial
peace and prevent strikes and worker violence. But these policy reasons are not
applicable to commercial arbitration, which is simply an alternative to litigation, and
not one particularly favored by Congress, contrary to the Court's assertion. See
Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
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Southland Corp. v. Keating that the FAA, which the 1925 enacting Congress
believed to be a procedural statute applying only in federal court, was
substantive law that applied in state court and pre-empted state law.8 In
1985, the Court took another major step in rewriting arbitration law
when it determined that statutory anti-trust claims could be arbitrated in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chiysler-Plymouth, Inc."8 In 2001, after a
number of decisions expanding the reach of the FAA to virtually all
8119
statutory claims, the Court, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,9
determined that the exclusion of workers, set forth in the FAA and
confirmed by the legislative history, was only a very limited exclusion, so
that actually almost all workers were included within the scope of the
FAA. 9 1 The Court therefore determined that employees could be forced
to arbitrate all of their claims by their employers as a condition of
92
employment.
In these decisions, the Court kept moving away from concerns about
protecting individual rights. Using its judicially-created policies and
various interpretive methods, the Court has succeeded in denying access
to the courts and eroding protections legislated in the fields of federal
antitrust, securities and employment law. Moreover, by pre-empting state
law, the Court has prevented states from enforcing legislation that could
protect its citizens from potential abuses of arbitration.
The Court explained its revised view of Gardner-Denverby the "radical
change, over two decades, in the Court's receptivity to arbitration,"
cautioning that because of this radical change, one cannot rely on

previous decisions that do not reflect its current policy preferences .9 5

Its

"receptivity to arbitration" can best be understood in terms of some of
the major judicial policies it has created since the mid-1980s. These
Rrv. 753, 797 (1990) ("Arbitration in nonunion settings does not warrant an
aggressive pro-arbitration policy akin to the Steelworkers Trilogy.").
1465

U.S. 1, 11, 16 (1984).

"473 U.S. 614, 626-28 (1985).
See, e.g, Vimar

89

Seguros y Reaseaguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528

(1995) (Carriage of Goods by Sea Act claims); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (ADEA claims); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (securities claims); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (securities and RICO claims).
9532

U.S. 105 (2001).

9'See id. at 114-15, 119.
'2See

id. at 109, 119.

See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 688 (1996) (holding
that Montana state law requiring a notice be put on front of agreement if it contained
an arbitration clause was preempted by federal law, which did not allow arbitration to
be singled out for special treatment).
9' 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1470 (2009) (quoting Wright v.
Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77 (1998)).
95See Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1470.
93
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judicial policies have no basis in the text of the FAA, or in the intent of
Congress or the purpose of the Act. They are simply the Court's view of
what the national law and policy of arbitration should be:
1. There is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration .
2. Substantive rights are as well protected in arbitration as in
liiain97

Arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and
legal complexities of statutory claims.98
None of these policies are textually based, just as the majority's
interpretation of the NLRA, the ADEA, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
in Pyett were not textually based. However, they have been used in many
of the Court's opinions to bootstrap a result not indicated in the text or
legislative history. For example, in order to find in Mitsubishi that
antitrust claims were arbitrable, the Court faced a number of obstacles.
There was no support in the text of the FAA or in the text of the antitrust
statutes for arbitration of such claims, there were counter-indications in
the legislative history, and no prior Court had ever found antitrust claims
to be arbitrable.94 The major rationale of the Court for its creation of newlaw was the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,"0 a
policy it had created and announced in Moses H. Cone.'O
The second basic rationale in Mitsubishi for suddenly determining
that antitrust claims were arbitrable was that the dispute had anisen in an
international context. 0 2 However, this rationale quickly dropped to the
3.

9' Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
"' Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive ights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than ajudicial, forum.'). But see Edward Brunet &Jenniferj. Johnson,
Substantive Fairnessin Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 459, 491 (2008) (pointing
out that NASD (FINRA) securities arbitrations lack substantive fairness, and that
"[t]he social cost of such a lawless system of governance is considerable."). See also
infra, notes 118-20.
"Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1471 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
" See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 646 (Stevens,J., dissenting):
The plain language of this statute encompasses Soler's claims that arise out of its
contract with Mitsubishi, but does not encompass a claim arising under federal
law[] .... Nothing in the text of the 1925 Act, nor its legislative history, suggests
that Congress intended to authorize the arbitration of any statutory claims.
"0Id. at 625 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24).
...Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. See also supra note 86.
'2473 U.S. at 631. Referring first to "the emphatic federal policy in favor of
arbitral dispute resolution," the Court stated that the policy "applies with special
force in the field of international commerce." Id. According to the Court, "a strong
belief in the efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution of international
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wayside in subsequent domestic arbitration cases, as the Court decided in
case after case that every statute was arbitrable, unless an explicit
provision in another federal statute prevented it.100 In Pyett, therefore, the
Court reached out to snag the last bastion of resistance-statutory claims
under CBAs.
Although the Court claimed it distinguished rather than overruled
Gardner-Denver,14in
effect, virtually nothing remains of the decision. The
majority's primary means of distinguishing Pyett from Gardner-Denverwas
to claim that the Gardner-Denverholding was solely based on the narrow
ground that the CBA in that case did not specifically cover statutory
claims, unlike the CBA in Pyett. 01 5 It then asserted that all the other lines
of reasoning in Gardner-Denver were dicta, and were based on a
"1misconceived view of arbitration" 06 or "a distorted understanding. 1 0 7 In
other words, because the Supreme Court's view of arbitration in 2009
differed from its view in 1974, the earlier views were erroneous and could
not now be relied upon. This is exactly the basis for the criticism by
justice Stevens in his dissent, to the effect that the Court was ignoring
principles of stare decisis in favor of its current preference for

arbitration.

08

The majority defended itself, however, by strongly denying that its
preference for arbitration had anything to do with its decision. It asserted
that "contrary to justice Stevens' accusation, it is the Court's fidelity to
the ADEA's text-not an alleged preference for arbitration-that dictates
the answer to the question presented."'09 It then attacked justice Stevens
for ignoring the text and seeking to vindicate his own preferences, which,
according to the Court, "he disguises as a search for congressional
purpose."" 0 In its attack, the majority did not respond to the specific
commercial disputes" outweighed prior views that antitrust claims were not
arbitr-able. Id.
'0' See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.. 490 U.S. 477. 483
(1989) ("Under [the FAA], the party opposing arbitration carries the burden of
showing that Congress intended in a separate statute to preclude a waiver ofjudicial
remedies, or that such a waiver of judicial remedies inherently conflicts with the
underlying purposes of that other statute." (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987))).
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 n.8 (2009).
05See id. at 1468.
16Id. at 1469.
17Id. at 1470.
Id. at 1475 (StevensJ , dissenting) ("Notwithstanding the absence of change
in any relevant statutory provision, the Court has recently retreated from, and in
some cases reversed, prior decisions based on its changed view of the merits of
arbitration.... Today the majority's preference for arbitration again leads it to
disregard our precedent.").
9Id.
110

at 1470 n.9.

Id.
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pointJustice Stevens made in his dissent in Pyett, which was thatJustices
should not overturn an interpretation of an Act of Congress that has
been settled for many years, just because they may have conflicting policy
interests."I' Rather, the majority referred to justice Stevens' dissent in
Gilmer in 1991, where he said that permitting the compulsory arbitration
of employment discrimination claims conflicted with the congressional
purpose animating the ADEA."12 Apparently, the majority reached back to
Gilmer because it wanted to set up a conflict between textualist and
purposivist approaches, so that it could then state: "This Court is not
empowered to incorporate such a preference into the text of a federal
3
Thus, the Court appears to be saying that if a justice tries to
statute. ""1
ascertain a congressional purpose, it will be viewed as merely his own
personal preference. For the Court, the only preferences which are
entitled to weight are the Court's own judicially-created preferences,
unconnected to any intent of Congress or purpose of the legislation.
Moreover, because the Court's preferences have changed since Gardner4
Denver, the prior policies expressed there are no longer valid."1
The Court's preference for arbitration is evident in its efforts to
explain away some of the other lines of reasoning in Gardner-Denver,
based on its newer perspectives. The Court emphasized, for example, its
current policy that substantive rights are not affected by a change of
forum, and that in Gardner-Denver the Court erroneously assumed that a
waiver of the right to ajudicial forum was a waiver of substantive rights."15
Under the Pyett Court's policy, rights such as the right to bring a claim in
court are procedural and can be waived.'' 6
The Court's current policy that no substantive rights are affected
simply by having them determined in an arbitral rather than a judicial
forum cuts against earlier Supreme Court policy which, according to the
majority, the Court has abandoned."' An example of the abandoned
policy is the statement in Gardner-Denver that "we have long recognized
that 'the choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive
right to be vindicated.""' Other earlier Supreme Court cases also noted
11See id.
Id.; Gilmer v. interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 41 (1991).
".. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1470 n.9.
"' See id. at 1470.
15Id.
...See id. at 1470-71.
".. Id. at 1470.
...415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) (quoting U.S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351,
359-60 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)). The Gardner-DenverCourt also pointed out
that:
the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial
factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the
usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil
"12
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that rights were less well protected by arbitration because of the lack of
trial by jury, the fact that arbitrators do not always give reasons for their
results, the record of proceedings is not as complete, and judicial review
of the award is much more limited than judicial review of a trial." In
addition, commentators have noted that the process of arbitration can
undermine protection of an individual's statutory rights."' 0
The Supreme Court's adoption of the policy that there is no
difference in the protection of substantive rights in arbitration than in a
court proceeding simply does not take into account the limited discover-y
available in arbitration, the lack of a jury trial, and the limited judicial
review. Moreover, the Court asserted, without any support except its own
judicial fiat, that concerns that arbitrators may not be competent to
resolve questions of public law and that arbitration may be ill-suited as a
forum for the resolution of statutory rights are "misconceptions [that]
have been corrected. 2

trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony
under oath are often severely limited or unavailable.
415 U.S. at 57-58.
.. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) ("The
nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights
behind a cause of action. The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may
make a radical difference in ultimate result."); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 744-45 (1981) ("[Nlot only are arbitral procedures less protective
of individual statutory rights than are judicial procedures, but arbitrators very often
are powerless to grant the aggrieved employees as broad a range of relief." (citations
omitted)); McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984) ("[A]rbitral
factfindingeeal
o
iaettojudicial factfinding.... '[T] he record of the
arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply;
and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory
process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or
unavailable.'" (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58)).
'0See, e.g, Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359 (1985) (noting that
processes that are informal and lack safeguards may increase the risk of class-based
discrimination); Elizabeth A. Roma, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment
Contracts and the Need for MeaningflJudicialReview, 12 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
519, 520 (2004) (-Unfortunately, the very features that attract parties to ADR
undermine the protection of an individual's statutory rights. Because ADR is less
formal and is not held to the same standards as judicial proceedings, there is a risk
that laws may be misapplied, or not applied at all, and thatjustice will be exchanged
for efficiency."); Carrngton & Haagen, supra note 36, at 348 ("While discovery may
be regarded as a mixed blessing at best, because of its costs, it cannot be doubted that
the availability of discovery assures that courts are in general more effective than
arbitral tribunals in detecting wrongdoing and enforcing the rights of victims,
whether of securities fraud, price-fixing conspiracies, race or gender discrimination,
or environmental misdeeds.").
121 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1471.
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In support of the suitability of arbitration, the Court noted in a
footnote in Pyett that arbitration remains subject to judicial review. 12 2 It
did not point out, however, that judicial review of arbitration decisions
rendered pursuant to a CBA is not a review on the merits.122 Courts are
highly deferential to arbitrators' decisions and are not authorized to
review for legal or factual errors or misinterpretations of the contract.12
Because there is no review of any error of law or fact for an arbitral
award, the determination of a statutory claim in arbitration results in
unreviewable discretion by the arbitrator. The rights against
discrimination that Congress sought to provide are thus subject to
erroneous, uncorrectable decisions by an arbitrator. The fact that an
arbitrator may just get it wrong, with no mechanism for the wrong to be
corrected by a court, is far more serious when public law issues affecting
many people are at stake than in the typical arbitration that only affects
two contracting parties. 1 2 5 The trade-off of convenience or efficiency for
an unreviewable application of the law may be acceptable in a
commercial case where parties have clearly consented to the arbitral
forum. However, in the case of individual statutory rights, particularly
where the parties have not consented to arbitrate, the exchange of a
court proceeding for arbitration is not consistent with the protections
Congress intended to provide in Title VII and the ADEA.
The final line of reasoning from Gardner-Denverthat the Court felt
obliged to discredit in Pyett was the concern that the Gardner-DenverCourt
expressed about a union's exclusive control over whether it would
arbitrate an individual grievance and the possibility that a union might
subordinate the interest of individual employees to the collective interest
'22

Id. at 1471 n.10.

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960) ("The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the
proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.").
24 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)
("Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits despite
allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties'
agreement." (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36
(1987))).
.2.A number of commentators have written about the need for heightened
scrutiny of statutory claims decided in arbitration. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Interstate
Arbitration: Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, in ARBITRATION LAW INAMERJcA: A
CRrricAL ASSESSMENT 88, 1114 (2006) (stating that for arbitration of any claims under
mandatory laws, a court should review the award to ensure correct application of the
law); Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at
International Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. U.L. REv. 453, 514 (1999) ("Unless U.S.
courts are deter-mined to abdicate completely their responsibility for participating in
the enforcement of mandatory U.S. law, they must undertake some review
of... arbitral resolutions of claims arising under mandatory U.S. law, and their
review must depart significantly from current standards that properly permit virtually
no merits reviews of arbitral resolutions of nonmandatory law claims.").
23
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of all employees. 26Interestingly,
the Pyett Court did not mention a
further concern expressed in Gardner-Denverthat in light of Congress's
decision to afford individuals protection against discrimination by unions
under Title VII, there could well be a conflict of interest between the
employee and the union with respect to a discrimination claim. 2
The Pyett Court's response to the question of conflict was that this
'Judicial policy concern" cannot be relied upon as authority "for
introducing a qualification into the ADEA that is not found in its text. ,2
It further stated that the Court should not substitute its view of policy for
legislation passed by Congress, and that it is not proper to consider any
alleged conflict of interest between a union and its members "[u] ntil
Congress amends the ADEA to meet the conflict of interest concern
identified in the Gardner-Denver dicta.
,129 The Court did not seem
troubled that its own judicial policy concerns cannot be found in any
text.2 0
One might find it difficult to discern from the Court's statement how
to distinguish a judicial policy concern that is not in the text, and is
therefore not acceptable, from ajudicial policy concern that also is not in
the text, but is acceptable. Take, for example, the judicial policy concerns
expressed by the majority that the rights protected by Title VII and the
ADEA are substantive rights that are as equally well-protected in
arbitration as in court13 and that the right to go to court is a procedural

Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1472.
127 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n. 19 (1974). Chief justice
Warren Burger expressed this concern graphically in his dissent in Barrentine v. Ark.Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, (1981). Chief justice Burger disagreed with the
majority's view that a FELA claim could be brought in court after having been
unsuccessfully submitted to a grievance committee under a CBA. However, he agreed
with the majority and with the Gardner-Denverdecision that claims under civil rights
statutes
should not be subject to waiver by a collective-bargaining agreement negotiated
by a union.... The long history of union discrimination against minorities and
women .. , led Congress to forbid discrimination by unions as well as employers.
Against a background of union discrimination, Congress was aware that, in the
context of claims under the Civil Rights Act, unions sometimes had been the
adversary of workers. Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional
objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to
allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the right
to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts to defer to arbitral
decisions reached by the same combination of forces that had long perpetuated
invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the chickens.
Barrentine,450 U.S. at 749-50 (citations omitted).
...129 S. Ct. at 1472.
129 id.
121

"0See sup-a, text accompanying notes 96-101.
See Pyet, 1295. Ct. at 1471.

131
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is no statutory basis
right-not a right protected by the statutes. 12There
for these policy determinations. Thus, one would think that if the Court
were consistent, it would not give credence to such policies unless
Congress amended the text of the statutes to address those policy issues.
Moreover, the current texts of both Title VII and the ADFA appear
to contradict the Court's declared policy about the right to go to court,
because both statutes clearly give plaintiffs-a right to bring their action in
court.13 3

The four person minority in Pyett noted the weakness of the

majority's position on this point in its dissent:
The majority seems inexplicably to think that the statutory right to a
federal forum is not a right, or that Gardner-Denver failed to
recognize it because it is not "substantive." But Gardner-Denver
forbade union waiver of employees' federal forum rights in large
part because of the importance of such rights and a fear that unions
would too easily give them up to benefit the many at the expense of
the few, 34
a far less salient concern when only economic interests are
at stake.
It appears that the only way to distinguish policies that the Pyett majority
finds are acceptable (even though they have no textual support), and
those it claims are unacceptable, (because they do not have textual
support) is to consider the twin goals of the current majority: (1) keep
individual rights cases from having access to court, and (2) minimize
protections created by Congress for parties with little or no bargaining
power. With that perspective, one can understand why specific policies
are or are not acceptable to the Pyett majority.
Essentially, the decision in Pyett represents a high-water mark of
disingenuousness. 33 The Court claimed to rely on statutory text when
there was no textual support to be found for its preferred position. It
condemned justice Stevens's dissent for focusing on congressional
purposes, claiming he was interpreting the statute according to his
personal preferences. At the same time, the Court made clear that its
own judicially-created policies were the basis for ignoring congressional
purpose in statutes such as the ADEA, Title VII, and the 1991 Civil Rights
See id. at 1469-70.
See ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1) (2006) ("Any person aggrieved may bring a
civil action in any court of competent j urisdicti on for such legal or equitable relief as
will effectuate the purposes of [the Act]"); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (3) (2006)
("Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under
this [title].").
''129 S. Ct. at 1480 n.2. (SouterJ, dissenting) (citations omitted).
'35 justice Stevens pointed out that the majority's derision of the "policy concern"
133

11

regarding a union's conflict of interest "is particularly disingenuous given its
subversion of Gardner-Denver'sholding in the service of an extratextual policy favoring
arbitration." Id. at 1476 (StevensJ, dissenting).
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Act, and instead imposing its own current preferences, in complete
disregard of the principles of stare decisis.
D. Disregardof the Facts
What is perhaps equally disturbing is that the Court did not deal with
the actual facts of the case. The employees, who were not parties to the
CBA, did not participate in the negotiations between the employer and
the union, who were parties. 3 Therefore, they apparently did not know
until the union filed an amicus brief at the Supreme Court level that the
CBA did not require the employees to arbitrate their ADEA claims with
the employer if the union decided not to initiate arbitration.13
Consequently, they did not raise this issue in the lower courts. The
union's amicus brief in the Supreme Court proceedings makes clear what
the actual agreement was.13 8 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,3 the union and the employer
association, the Realty Advisory Board, had agreed that if the employee
requested arbitration of statutory discrimination claims and the union
agreed, then (1) the claims would be arbitrated, (2) the decision of the
arbitrator would be binding, and (3) the employee would not be able to
bring a subsequent discrimination claim regarding the same matter in
140
court.
The CBA did not provide, however, that if the union decided not to
arbitrate the statutory discrimination claim, the 14employee
would be
required to arbitrate its claim with the employer. 1The employee was
free to litigate that claim in court. Although during negotiations the
employer had proposed a provision for the CBA that would require, as a
condition of employment, that employees must arbitrate directly with the
employer any discrimination claim not brought by the union, this

provision was rejected by the union, and the employer withdrew

it.14

The Supreme Court became aware of this after certiorari was
granted. Because this issue had not been raised below, however, the

'-Brief of the Service Employees International Union, supra note 47, at 4 ("The
collective bargaining agreement at issue in this case is the 2002 'Contractors
Agreement' between Local 32BJ and the Realty Advisor-y Board on Labor Relations,
Inc.").
"Id. at 14. ("[T~he amended no-discrimination clause does not constitute a
written agreement allowing employees to arbitrate statutory discrimination, much less
an agreement requiring employees to arbitrate such claims where the Union has
declined to arbitrate them.").
'
See id. at 13-14.
525 U.S. 70 (1998).
Brief of the Service Employees International Union, supra note 47, at 13.
''See id. at 14.
12id.

HeinOnline -- 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 850 2010

20101

2010]
THE PRETEXT OF TEXTUALISM85

851

Court refused to consider it. The Court stated that it would affirm on
grounds not raised below only in exceptional circumstances, and it did

not consider this case to be exceptional . 14 3

It

therefore announced that

the arguments concerning the content of the CBA "have been
forfeited."'" Wanting to reach a particular result, the Court preferred to
decide a case that was not in fact before it.
In so doing, the Court has created enormous problems that will have
to be resolved, probably through litigation, because it has so

fundamentally ignored or contradicted the way CBAs normally work .' 4 5

It

also has created more questions than answers with its assertion that "a
46
substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld.,
For example, it did not determine whether a substantive waiver of rights
had occurred in the instant case. 14 7 In Pyett, of course, the union had
refused to arbitrate on behalf of the employees, and, under the Court's
decision, the employees had no right to file suit in court. Moreover, the
arbitration clause of the CBA makes clear that "all Union claims are
brought by the Union alone," and that "no individual may compromise
or settle any claim without the written per-mission of the Union." There
is no provision in the CBA for the employee to directly arbitrate with the
employer. If the employees are barred from going to court, and there is
no provision in the CBA permitting employees to arbitrate their statutory
claims, it would be difficult not to find that their substantive civil rights
have been waived.
111. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Procedurally, the case also raises but does not answer a number of
questions. The case came before the Court pursuant to an interlocutory
appeal under section 16(a) of the FAA, because the lower courts had
refused to grant the employer's motion to compel arbitration under
sections 3 and 4 of the FAA.149 The Court did not deal with the question

' See
14 see

14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009).

id.

generally, Alan Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn
Plaza v. Pyett: Letting DiscriminationDefendants Decide Whether Plaint~ffMay Sue Them, 25
45See

OHIO ST.

J. Disp.

RESOL.

(forthcoming 2010). ("Pyett reverses a previously unbroken

line of precedents keeping employees' rights under collective bargaining agreements
separ-ate from their ights under state and federal statutes and common law ....
Under any reading .. . the decision will now lead to a lengthy future chain of
cases.. . .)
P4
yett, 129 S. Ct. at 1474.
14 id.
'~ Brief of the Service Employees
International Union, supra note 47, at 7
(alterations omitted).
14
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1463.
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of whether the FAA applies to CBAs covered by the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA). The lower courts apparently assumed that it did,
but most lower courts have held otherwise, finding that CBAs are covered
by section 301 of the LMRA, 150 and are not within the scope of the FAA.' 51
This raises questions about whether the Court intended to merge section
301 into the FAA, and whether section 301 has retained independent
meaning.
But even assuming that one could apply the FAA to compel
arbitration under a CBA, nonetheless, in determining whether
arbitration should be compelled, the first thing a court should consider is
whether there is a written arbitration agreement between the two parties,
as required by the FAA. 152 Because the CBA empowers only the union to
bring claims in arbitration, and because the employee is not a party to
the arbitration agreement, there is no written arbitration agreement
between the parties. It is the normal practice that unless there is a written
agreement between parties to arbitrate with each other, courts refuse to
stay proceedings."13 Accordingly, the Supreme Court's reversal of the

"0 Section 301 of the LMRA has been codified as 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).
11See

Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Local 2121 v. Goodrich, 410

F.3d 204, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[M]ost courts, both before and after Circuit City,
adhere to the traditional view that suits arising under Section 301 and concerning
collective bargaining agreements are outside the scope of the FAA."). See, eg., IBEW,
Local 545 v. Hope Elec. Corp., 380 F.3d 1084, 1097 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that
nothing in Circuit City undermines the Supreme Court's holding in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1957) (that section 301 "provides an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction to enforce labor arbitration")); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Local 812, 242 F.3d 52, 53 (2d
Cir. 2001) ("We hold that in cases brought under section 301 ... the FAA does not
apply."); Int'l Chem. Workers Union v. Columbian Chems. Co., 331 F.3d 491, 494
(5th Cir. 2003) (citing, inter alia, Coca-Coca Bottling Co. and stating that the "district
court appropriately relied only on [section 301, as opposed to the FAA] when it
confirmed the arbitration award because this case involves arbitration under a
CBA."). But see Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Local 232, Int'l Union, Allied Indus.
Workers of Am., 36 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1994) ("As it happens, however, our
circuit is among the minority that has limited § 1 [of the FAA] to the transportation
industries and therefore applies the Arbitration Act to most collective bargaining
agreements." (citing Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150,
351 F.2d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1965))).
"'2 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
'3See, eg, Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1278-79 (2009) (describing
how Maryland courts follow federal procedure with respect to determining if there is
a valid arbitration agreement: "'If a party to an arbitration agreement ... refuses to
arbitrate, the other party may file a petition with a court to order arbitration .... If
the court determines that the agreement exists, it shall order arbitration. Otherwise it
shall deny the petition.'" (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JuD. PROC. § 3-207
(Lexisexis 2006))). See also CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHozAL, COMMERciAL ARBITRATION:
CASES AND PROBLEMS, 51 (1st ed. 2002) ("The arbitration agreement must be in
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lower courts' denial of the motion to compel arbitration under the FAA
does not seem well-grounded in the law.
The Court's decision, as well as the methodology used to reach that
decision, is inconsistent with the statutes it interpreted to reach its
preferred result. Using the pretext of textualism, the Court in Pyett, as
well as in earlier arbitration decisions, has disregarded and distorted
legislation to create an arbitration law that does not comply with the
legislation adopted by Congress. Pyett should be understood as a strong
and compelling invitation to Congress to reinstitute the protections in its
legislation that have been eroded by uncabined judicial discretion. One
way to accomplish this goal is for Congress to adopt the Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009.
IV. ARBITRATION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2009
Congress has recently taken note of the exclusion of so many
individuals from access to the court by means of arbitration clauses
imposed upon them without their consent. Currently pending bills on
arbitration fairness in both the House and Senate would amend the FAA
54
to make certain pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable.
Arbitration clauses that were entered into before a dispute arose, in
situations where one party essentially had no bargaining power, would
simply not be enforced. The bills in both the House and the Senate apply
to employees, consumers, franchisees, and civil rights plaintiffs. 155 They
set forth extensive findings of Congress, which are identical in the two
bills, about the negative impact of arbitration on individuals with little
6
bargaining power. 15
The findings are quite explicit in stating that the
Supreme Court has changed the meaning of the FAA by extending it to
disputes between parties of greatly disparate economic power.' 57 Further,
the findings note that such mandatory arbitration undermines the
development of public law because it is not transparent, there is no right
to a jury,151and there is no meaningful judicial review of arbitrators'
decisions.
Congress's findings emphasize that "because entire
industries are adopting these clauses, people increasingly have no choice
but to accept them. They must often give up their rights as a condition of
having a job, getting necessary medical care, buying a car, opening a

writing: only 'written provisions' to settle disputes by arbitration are enforceable."

(citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006))).
54Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).

§ 3 (a); H.R. 1020 § 4(4) (b) (1).
§ 2(3); H.R. 1020 § 2(3).
931 § 2(2); H.R. 1020 § 2(2).
931 §§ 2(2), (5), (6); H.R. 1020 §§ 2(2), (5), (6).

55. 931
''S.
17S.
''S.

931
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bank account, getting a credit card, and the like." 5 9 The findings also
point to abuses by many corporations, whose mandatory arbitration
clauses include "unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems against
individuals, including provisions that strip individuals of substantive
statutory rights, ban class actions, and force people to arbitrate their
claims hundreds of miles from their homes."'60
Although both the House and Senate Bills agree that the solution is
to ban pre-dispute arbitration 1 clauses in employment, consumer,
there is a great deal of difference in
franchise, or civil rights disputes,
the details. In 2007, the two bills were essentially the same, but when
reintroduced in 2009, the Senate Bill had been changed in significant
ways. One of those changes relates to the Pyett decision. Although both
bills exclude application to any arbitration provision in a CBA, the Senate
Bill goes further:
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to any arbitration provision in a
contract between an employer and a labor organization or between
labor organizations, except that no such arbitrationprovision shall have
the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicialenforcement of a
right arising under a provision of the Constitution of the United States, a
State constitution, or a Federal or State statute, or public policy arising
62

therefrom.'1

The italicized portion of the text above leaves no doubt that the Pyett
decision would be overturned by Congress if the Senate Bill were
adopted. It is also clear that in 2007, the drafters of both bills saw no
need to include this language because until Pyett it was understood that
employees' rights to a judicial forum for statutory claims could not be
63
waived by a CBA. 1

The Arbitration Fairness Act would restore the FAA to its purpose as
enacted by Congress in 1925 and as interpreted by the Court for
approximately the first sixty years of its existence. The 1925 Congress was
concerned that arbitration be voluntary and that it not be imposed by
powerful parties on weaker parties. The Court did not begin to enforce
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts until the last twenty to twentyit started down this path, however, businesses in a
five years. 14Once
broad range of industries quickly began adding arbitration clauses to all

931 § 2(3); H.R. 1020 § 2(3).
931 § 2(7); H.R. 1020 § 2(7).
See S. 931, §3; H.R. 1020 §4(4) (b)(1).

5'.

60S.
161

S. 931 § 3(a) (emphasis added).
''
See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (noting that
employees' fights to a judicial forum for statutory claims could not be waived by a
GBA).
"4See Jean Stemnight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just? 57 STAN. L. REv.
1631, 1636-37 (2005).
162
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kinds of contracts.'16 5 In addition, against the clear weight of evidence to
the contrary in both text and legislative history,""6 the Court in Circuit City
interpreted the FAA to cover arbitrations between employers and
employees. 6 7 These kinds of non-volitional arbitrations are exactly what
the enacting Congress disfavored."8 At the hearings, members of
Congress sought and received assurance from the drafters and
proponents that the FAA would not cover arbitrations that were not

voluntary.16
The Supreme Court, in its arbitration decisions culminating in Pyett,
has followed its policy preference that consent is not necessary for
arbitration agreements to be enforced. For its purposes, if the stronger
economic party can force the weaker into arbitration, this will help clear
court dockets. It will also lessen the protections enacted by Congress for
the benefit of those weaker parties, since in arbitration there will be less
of a right to discovery, no jury trial, and no judicial review on the merits.
In Gilmer, the Court held that the employee was required to arbitrate an
ADEA claim with his employer, even though Mr. Gilmer had merely
registered as a securities representative with several stock exchanges, asrequired by his employer. 10In
the registration application was a
provision that indicated an agreement to arbitrate any controversy
covered by stock exchange
rules, including termination of

'
See, e.g, Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAw IN
AMERIcA 8 (2006) ("[R]epeat users of arbitration include banks, credit card issuers,
computer manufacturers, physicians, securities brokers, car dealers, and chain
restaurant franchisers . .. ."); Stemnlight, supra note 164, at 1638-39 ("[A]rbitration
[is] mandated by a broad range of industries, including financial institutions (as to
personal accounts, house and car loans, payday loans, and credit cards), service
providers (termite exterminators, gymnasiums, telephone companies, and tax
preparers), and sellers of goods (mobile homes, computers, and eBay) .... health
care (hospitals and health maintenance organizations), nursing homes, and
educational institutions." (citations omitted)).
..
See David Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv 33, 76 (1997)
("rhe drafters and proponents of the FAA were extremely clear .. , their intention
was limited to the commercial paradigm, and excluded contracts of employment. ").
See also Moses, supra note 54, at 146-52 (discussing how the text and legislative history
of the FAA concerning employment contracts demonstrate that, "in 1925 . .. no
workers were covered by the FAA.").
67Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
''Members
of Congress raised questions during the Hearings about the
voluntary nature of the arbitration contemplated under the Act. For example,
Senator Walsh of Montana expressed concern about unequal bargaining situations
where one party was required to enter a contract on a "take-it or leave-it basis." See
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:joint Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before
the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the judiciaiy, 68th Cong. 9 (1924).
See id. at 10, 14, 15.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).

HeinOnline -- 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 855 2010

856
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

856

[o.1: 14:3
[Vol.

employment. 1'For
the Court, this fig leaf of consent was enough to
require Mr. Gilmer to arbitrate his age discrimination claims. From the
Court's perspective, "' [h] aving made the bargain to arbitrate, [Mr.

Gilmer] should be held

to it

. . .

.-

17

It was of no consequence that the

"bargain" was not negotiated, but simply imposed. Thus, it was short step
for the Court in Pyelt to simply remove the fig leaf of consent and lay bare
the non-volitional state of the arbitration process it preferred. For that
reason, it found no difference in "the status of arbitration agreements
signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union
representative."' 7 ' Consent by the individual simply did not matter to the
Court.
The Arbitration Fairness Act makes consent matter again. 1 14 If
disputes cannot be resolved by arbitration unless parties make that
choice after the dispute has arisen, there is more likelihood of an actual
choice, and therefore genuine consent. There is also an incentive for
employers, if they believe arbitration is a better method of dispute
resolution than litigation, to work to provide a system that is fair and
reasonable so that the other party will want to choose arbitration. That
incentive is lacking when arbitration is imposed.
It is, of course, difficult to get legislation through Congress, and
unclear whether the Arbitration Fairness Act will be enacted. The wheels
of Congress tend to move slowly, and the movement is distorted by
interest groups that can bring resources to bear to defeat passage of
legislation they do not want. Corporations and industries are strongly in
favor of mandatory arbitration, which avoids jury trials and denies access
to court for consumers, investors, and employees. Moreover, many
industries are able to "stack the deck" against the economically weaker
party by creating an arbitration process which does not provide a level
playing field 1.
There will thus be strong opposition to any attempts to eliminate
mandatory arbitration or to amend the FAA in other ways to overturn the

Id.
Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 476 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
1114 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465 (2009).
'74 See Edward
Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. Rrv. 39, 84 (2000) ("Arbitration needs a substantial dose of
freedom and creativity to thrive. This essential self-governance can be achieved by
allowing party autonomy to fashion arbitration procedures deemed essential by the
contracting partners.").
'3See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111 th Cong. § 2 (7) (2009); H.R.
1020, 111 th Cong. § 2 (7) (2009) ("Many corporations add to their arbitration clauses
unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems against individuals, including
provisions that strip individuals of substantive statutory rights, ban class actions, and
force people to arbitrate their claims hundreds of miles from their homes.").
'7'

172
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Supreme Court's recent rewriting of the original statute. The question is
whether there is enough political will and organized strength to push
back against the organized interests that are enormously pleased with the
status quo. The Supreme Court has imposed by judicial fiat a legislative
program that will not be easy to change through the democratic process.
Nonetheless, there are signs that the negative impact on our justice
system of using mandatory arbitration to deny access to courts have
begun to register with Congress. For example, the recently enacted
Franken Amendment to the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations
Act'716 restricts defense contractors and subcontractors from entering into
or enforcing any employment contract
that requires, as a condition of employment, that the employee or
independent contractor agree to resolve through arbitration any
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort
related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment, including
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress~ false
imprisonment, or negligent hiring, supervision, or retention.M
This amendment was prompted by the case of Jamie Leigh Jones, a
former employee of Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) (formerly owned by
Halliburton) who reported being assaulted and gang-raped by co-workers
in Iraq.17 1 KBR and Halliburton wanted to handle her case in arbitration,
asserting that her claims were all employment related and covered by an
arbitration agreement. However, the Fifth Circuit ruled in September
2009, that her tort claims could be decided in court. 7 9 The Franken
Amendment goes further than the Fifth Circuit decision because it
eliminates any argument
excludes Title VII claims from arbitration 10and
that torts connected with sexual assault, whether or not related to
employment, could be covered by an arbitration clause .'8 ' Neither
Congress nor the Fifth Circuit believed that such egregious conduct
should be relegated to a private, confidential system of dispute
resolution.

Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409 (2009). Contracts under
$1,000,000 are exempt from the provision.
176

17 id.
SeeJones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 2009). After Ms. Jones
reported the incident, her employers confined her under armed guard in a shipping
container and did not permit her to leave or to contact her family for an extended
period. Id. at 232.
171 Id. at 230.
...There may be a question about whether the language is intended to cover all
Tidle VII claims of covered employees or just Title VII claims that raise issues of sexual
assault or harassment. On its face, however, the language appears to be broadly
applicable to all Title VII claims.
1"1 Department of Defense Appropriations Act § 8116.
"'8
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Another area where Congress has acted to curb potential abuses of
arbitration is with respect to terms of consumer credit provided to
members of the armed forces and their dependents. 1 2 The legislation
was supported by a Department of Defense Report on Predatory Lending
Practices Directed at Members of the Armed Forces and Their
Dependents, which criticized the use of mandatory arbitration in any
agreement with members of the armed forces concerning the extension
of consumer credit. 8 3 The report considered mandatory arbitration
clauses as one of the predatory characteristics of loan contracts and
payday loans, and found that "[~b]y eliminating a borrower's right to sue
for abusive lending practices, these clauses work to the benefit of ..
lenders over consumers."'m The ensuing legislation amended Title X of
the United States Code to add a new section on terms of consumer credit
extended to members of the military and their dependents." The last
provision of this section renders unenforceable an agreement to arbitrate
any dispute involving the extension of consumer credit to members of

the military or their dependents.18
There are a few other enacted bills, and a number of other pending
bills, that limit the application of arbitration in particular situations.'
Congress has clearly indicated an interest in stopping some of the worst
abuses. It could take a major step by adopting the Senate version of the
Arbitration Fairness Act. The legislation would overturn the Pyett decision
and restore to arbitration the requirement of consent that was so

important

to

the

enacting

Congress. 118Restoring

the

consent

.8.See 10 U.S.C. § 987 (2006).
83.

See U.S.

DEP'T. OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES DIRECTED AT

MEMBERS OF THE ARMED

FORCES AND

THEIR DEPENDENTS,

51 (2006), available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report-to-.Congress-final.pdf.
..
Id.at 13-14.

..10 U.S.C. § 987(a).
See id. at §987(f) (4).
For example, an amendment was enacted in 2002 to the Automobile Dealer's
Day in Court Act, which prohibited pre-dispute arbitration agreements between
automobile dealers and manufacturers. 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006). Some
pending bills include the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R.
1237, 111th Congress § 17(b) (2009), which renders unenforceable pre-dispute
arbitration agreements between residents of a long-termn care facility and the facility,
the Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 991, 111th Cong. § 1003(a) (2009), which
prohibits pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts, and the
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. § 206
(2009), which has passed the House. It prohibits creditors, assignees and securitizers
from requiring consumers to enter pre-dispute arbitration agreements or from
imposing other nonjudicial procedures.
"'Although there have been some criticisms of the Arbitration Fairness Act as
not being consistent with international practice, those criticisms were directed to the
2007 version. See, e.g, Emmanuel Gaillard &Jennifer Younan, Praposed US. Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, NEW YORK LAw JouRNAL, Apr. 22, 2008, at 3, 7. Most of these
6
187
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requirement would encourage arbitration to be used in ways that do not
damage our system of justice. The Arbitration Fairness Act would help
undo the tilt toward big business that the Supreme Court has fostered by
the preference it has imposed for denying access to courts for parties
with little bargaining power. It would not affect arbitration between
merchants with more or less equal bargaining power, for whose benefit
the FAA was passed in 1925. Rather, it would help return arbitration to
the status quo ante, after ajudicially-created anomaly of twenty-five years.
V. CONCLUSION
In Pyett, the Supreme Court has reached out to make new arbitration
law and policy, claiming that its decision is compelled by statutory text,
despite the absence of any text supporting this position. It has
overturned precedent without a compelling reason, finding its own
changed view of arbitration to suffice. The caliber of its reasoning does
not persuade. The Court has provided faulty interpretations of statutory
text to reach a decision that undermines Congress's protections of
individual rights. In running roughshod over Congress's properly
enacted legislation, the Court has exceeded its judicial role, undermined
its credibility, and lost any right to deference by the legislative branch of
government. To stop further erosion of individual rights by the Court,
Congress should take steps to overturn Pyett and return the requirement
of consent to arbitration.

criticisms are no longer an issue in the Senate version of the 2009 bill, although they
are relevant to the House version. For criticisms of the 2007 Act from an international
perspective, see generally Edna Sussman, The Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended
Consequences Threaten US. Business, 18 Am. REv. INT'L ARB. 455 (2007). The 2009
Senate version of the Act would make the U.S. practice in arbitration more consistent
with international practice, because the U.S. is one of the only countries that permits
arbitration to be imposed on consumers and employees. See Christopher R. Drahozal,
New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United States, 54 Am. J. COMP. L. 233,
253 (Supp. 2006); jean R. Sternlight, Is the US. Out on a Limb? Comparing the US.
Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World,
56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 850 (2002) ("Despite my attempts, I have not yet identified
any countries outside the United States and the European Union in which companies
are regularly using pre-dispute arbitration agreements to require consumers to
resolve their complaints through private arbitrators.").
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